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CHECKS.
(Second sub-division.)
BANK'S

RIGHT TO RECOVER MONEY PAID ON FORGED

CHECKS.

In 1802 it was decided that money paid on a forged check,
that is, a check to which the drawer's name was forged, by the
bank on which the check was drawn, could not be recovered
back from the innocent person to whom it made the payment.
W had a deposit in the bank. A check for $2,600 purportingto have been drawn by W in favor of T, or bearer, was presented to the bank prior to 1 o'clock, P. m., August 3d, 1798, by
L, and was entered by the receiving teller to L's credit in his
bank-book, as cash. It was likewise entered in the scratcher
and cash book, was credited to L and charged to W. Between
3 and 4 o'clock P. m. of the same day, the bank discovered that
the check was a forgery. The bank erased the credit to L and
the charge against W. L was promptly notified. In a suit by
L to recover the amount of this check, $2,600, as deposited %vith
the bank, it was held that he could recover. The acceptor of a
bill is, says Shippen, C. J., bound at the time of acceptance to
know whether the signature to it is genuine or not; he "takes
The same principle applies to the
this knowledge on himself."
payment of a bill or check, by the drawee. Hence, L could
recover though payment was made only by the entry of a credit
to L, and although the notice to him of the forgery was given
within three or four hours.

'Levy v. Bank of United States, 1 Binn, 27.
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5, 1849.
The 10th section of the act of April 5, 1849,2 enacts that whenever any value or amount shall be received as a consideration
for the negotiation, or in payment of any check, etc., by the
holder, from the endorsee, payer, and the signature of the
drawer, etc., shall have been forged thereon, such endorsee or
payer, may recover back from the person previously holding or
negotiating the same, the value or amount given or paid, with
lawful interest from the time that demand shall be made for
repayment. The rule in Levy v. Bank of the United States,
was assumed by Read, J. ,to be the rule in Pennsylvania, until the
passage of the act of 1849, 3 although it was supposed to be later
discovered that that act was but declaratory of the commcn law.4
Since that act was passed, the mere giving of credit, on its books,
to one who presents a forged check drawn upon it, does not
preclude it, on the discovery of the forgery, from cancelling the
credit;5 nor does the fact that the bank has actually paid the
money to the holder of the check, prevent its being recovered
back, if the holder, being agent for another, still has the
money.6
THE ACT OF APRIL

NEGLIGENCE.

The paying bank may be prevented from taking advantage
of the act of 1849 b3 its negligence, coupled with the exposedness
of the person from whom it seeks to recover the money, to loss,
should it recover the money. This negligence may consist
apparently in failure to discover the fact of forgery for too long
a time, and to give notice to the party to whom the payment has
been made.' When the check was received by the drawee
bank, through the clearing house, from another bank on June 3d,
and at noon on June 4th the former bank notified the latter that
L. 424; 1 Pa. L. 348.
Tradesman's Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 66 Pa. 435.
4
The act of 1849, said Porter, J., "came to declare the law."-Rick v.
Kelly, 30 Pa. .527; cf. Bank v. Bank, 159 Pa. 46. The act, said Paxson, J.,
"was not merely declaratory of the law as it then stood."-Corn Exchange
Nat. Bank v. Nat. Bank of the Republic, 78 Pa. 233.
5
Bank v. Bank, 159 Pa. 46. Read, J., remarked: "We are not called
upon to decide what would have been their [the defendants'] situation if
it had
been actually paid out to them."
6
Tradesmen's Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 66 Pa. 435; Bank v. Bank,
159 Pa. 46.
7Bank v. Bank, 159 Pa. 46; Rick v. Kelly, 30 Pa. 527.
2P.
3
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the check was a forgery, and demanded repayment, the former
bank was not too late.8 But in Iron City National Bank v.
Fort Pitt National Bank9 it is assumed by Mitchell, J., that it
is the duty of a bank, even after paying a check, to re-examine
it and re-investigate its genuiness, and that if it does not make
this re-investigation, and the bank would not have discovered
the forgery until the deposit book of the supposed drawer came
in for settlement, had not the bank to which the payment had
been made at the end of five days after the payment, suggested
the inquiry, it is guilty of negligence which will preclude a
recovery; if a recovery would then probably injure the bank to
whom a payment was made.
NEGLIGENCE IN

PAYING.

Possibly negligence of the bank in not inspecting the check
at the time of paying it, and in not then discovering that it was
a forgery, would preclude a recovery of the money. A was a
depositor in a bank. He usually took his checks from a book;
they were blue in color; they were puunched or perforated by a
stamp before presentation. The forged check which the bank
discounted, had none of these qualities. The trial court in the
action by the drawee bank against the bank to which the check
was paid, left to the jury to decide whether there was negligence. The jury apparently found that there was and gave a
verdict for so much of the money only as still remained in the
possession of the defendant. The judgment was reversed, Paxson, J., saying, inter alia, "A case could hardly arise of the payment of money upon a forged check, in which a plausible charge
of negligence could not be made. To hold that a failure to detect the forgery when such a check was presented for payment
amounts to such negligence as would prevent a recovery under
the act of 1849, would be to fritter away the act and render it
practically useless. The fact that the check was of a different
color from those usually drawn by the firm, and was not perforated, if evidence at all of negligence, was so unimportant as
not to justify the submission of the question to the jury."
"Corn Exchange Bank v. Nat. Bank of Republic, 78 Pa. 233. Notice on
the day following the payment of the check, that it is a forgery, is not too
late.-Stroudsburg Bank v. Shupp, 1 North. 35.
9159. Pa. 46.
' 0 Corn Exchange National Bank v. National Bank of Republic, 78 Pa.
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WHEN THE DEFENDANT WILL NOT BE HURT BY REPAYMENT.

Even if the depository bank is negligent in paying a forged
check, the person or bank, to which the payment is made, ought
not to escape the duty of repaying, unless on doing such it will
be certainly or probably subject to a loss. In Bank v. Bank"
the defendant bank had allowed its customer, for whom it had
obtained payment of the check to draw out $1,800 of the $1,957
on deposit. The forged check was $852.
The court does not
consider whether the plaintiff, found to have been negligent,
ought not, nevertheless, to have recovered $157, the amount
Which the defendant could have retained from its customer's
deposit. In Corn Exchange National Bank v. National Bank
of the Republic, 2 the forg'ed check paid by the plaintiff to the
defendant was for $2,000. The defendant allowed its customer,
to whom it had credited the check as a deposit, to withdraw
$1,800 of the deposit before it was notified of the forgery by
the plaintiff. The court below, on the hypothesis that the
plaintiff had been negligent, allowed it to recover only $200.
The Supreme Court, finding there was no sufficient evidence of
negligence, reversed, at the instance of the plaintiff. When no
part of the money paid by the drawee bank to the holder, also a
bank, has been paid out by the latter to anybody, the former
may recover the whole, although the notice of the forgery was
not given to the holder bank until two days after payment.
Whether there was any negligence in this delay, or otherwise,
on the part of the drawee bank is not discussed.'" The factthat
the defendant is the collecting agent of another bank, and, as
such, collected the check, is no obstacle to the recovery from it
of the money.'" The inability of the defendant to recover from
the forger, does not preclude a recovery from him."5
RETURN OF CHECK.

Possibly, if the check has any value to the former holder,
the offer to return it by the drawee bank, would be a precondition of its right to recover the money,' 6 but the return of the
check may have been waived by the defendant.
1159 Pa. 46.
Pa. 233.
"Tradesmen's Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 66 Pa. 435.
166 Pa. 435; 78 Pa. 233.
Ib78
Pa. 233.
' 6Roth v. Crissy, 30 Pa. 145.
"Stroudsburg v. Shupp, 1 North. 35.
1278

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
LIABILITY OF BANK TO DEPOSITOR.

185

FORGED ENDORSEMENT.

The bank has no authority to pay out the money of its depositor, except in conformity with his order, expressed in a
check. If he orders payment to X or order, only X or the
person to whom he orders payment by his endorsement, can be
paid out of his funds in the bank. If then the bank pays a
check drawn by him, but to one claiming under a forged endorsement of the payee, it pays its own money, not his. His
deposit remains undiminished by the payment."8
NEGLIGENCE IN ISSUING CHECKS.

Possibly, negligence in issuing the check, not to the payee,
but to X, claiming untruly to represent him, would preclude a
recovery from the bank, by the drawer of the check, for having
paid the check to his alleged attorney. But if he was a member of the bar, of an hitherto unblemished reputation, and if the
drawer of the check was advised by his own attorney to make it,
and if he knew of no facts that ought to have awakened his
suspicion, he will not be esteemed negligent in having carried
on the transaction with X, in the absence of the person whom
he pretended to represent. The depositor is not bound to exercise "the extremely high degree of care which would make it
impossible for an imposter to obtain from him a check payable
to his alleged principal."19
NEGLIGENCE OF DEPOSITOR.

EXAMINING CHECKS.

The depositor, when he learns of the payment of his check,
has certain duties cast on him with respect to the bank. But
he is under no duty, when his checks are returned, to examine
the endorsements upon them, in order to learn whether they are
genuine. "He has a right to assume that the bank, before
paying his checks, will ascertain the genuineness of the endorse18Clark v. Savings Bank, 31 Super. 647; Chambers v. Union Nat. Bank,
78 Pa. 205; United Security, etc., Co. v. Bank, 185 Pa. 586; Land Title,
etc., Co. v. Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230; Califf v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Super.
412; Houser v. Nat. Bank of Chambersburg, 27 Super. 613; West Phila.
Bank v. Green, 3 Penny. 457.
' 9Houser v. Nat. Bank, 27 Super. 613. Says Rice, P. J., When the
check is not delivered to the payee, but to a pretended agent, the drawer

riust use the care of a man of ordinary prudence in view of all the circumstances. Having done that, he is not bound to suffer the loss of his deposit, when the bank pays that check on the forged endorsement.
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ment. "2 So, if a check payable to Matilda Brown, is endorsed
"Matilda Brown, per M. C. Decker," the drawer of the dheck
may safely assume that the bank, before paying this check, ascertained the authority of Decker to endorse it." Hence,
failure to discover the forgery by an examination of the endorsements within a reasonable time after the return to the depositor
of his checks, from the bank, is not negligent. If, regularly,
the depositor would receive, on his obtaining the money on the
check, some voucher or security, and, he, in the case in
question, has received no such voucher, this fact would probably put on him the duty of suspecting that the payee of the
check had not in fact obtained the money, nor endorsed the
check. If the check has been made payable to X, in making a
loan to X, on a mortgage, the mere fact that the-lender has not
received the mortgage when the checkis returned frombank, two
or three weeks after the issue of the check, would have no significance
Every one knows that when loans are made on
mortgages in Philadelphia, weeks, and even months, elapse before the mortgage is returned from the office of the recorder or
from the title company or conveyancer to whose care its preparation and the examination of title are entrusted.22
DELAY IN

INFORMING BANK.

After the discovery of the forgery of an endorsement, the
drawer of the check may be negligent in delaying to give the
information to the bank. The discovery being made on March
27th, 1894, or immediately thereafter, or the facts making it
incumbent on the drawer to have then discovered the forgery,
failure to notify the bank until May 17th, would, apparently,
have been fatal to the right of the drawer to contest the bank's
right to charge his account with the check. But, if the drawer
did not in fact learn of the forgery until May 17th the fact that
an officer of it (a corporation) who committed the forgery knew
of it cannot be imputed to the corporation.' The corporation
is not bound to presume such a breach of duty by him. If the
drawer of the check paid by the drawee bank, on April 8th,
1901, receives information from the payee, in June 1903, that
20

United Security, etc., Co. v. Bank, 185 Pa. 586; Califf. v. First Nat.

Bank,
37 Super. 412.
21

Califf. v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Super. 412.
d.
3The
United Security Co. v. Bank, 185 Pa. 586.

22
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she has not received the money on the check, a delay in informing the bank until April, 1906, would be too great. But, if the
information from the payee was simply that she had not received the check, (the check being indorsed in her name" per M. C.
Decker"), since such non-receipt would be consistent with
Decker's having authority to receive it and endorse it in her
name, it would not be information that Decker had no such
authority and that she had not received the money upon the
check. 4
In McNeely Co. v. Bank of North America' forgeries of
endorsements upon checks issued by the company, occurred at
many times between April 20th, 1897, and February 24th,1903.
No negligence on the part of the company, in not discovering"
that these forgeries had occurred before January 21st, 1904,
was found to exist. But no notice was then given to the bank
for nearly three months. It was held that this delay exonerated
the bank of any duty to replace the plaintiff's money, paid
out on the checks with forged endorsements, although there was
no evidence that, with the earlier knowledge it could have recovered from the party to whom it paid the check, the forger or
others, there being likewise no evidence that it could not have
thus recovered. The banks, says Brown, J., may or may not be
able to recover from the forger by prompt action. Its right is
to try. The forger may be insolvent, or beyond civil or criminal
process, but by prompt proceedings against him others may
come to his assistance who, after delay, would not do so. As
prompt notice should be given to the bank, as, on dishonor of a
note, must be given to an endorser in order to hold him.
OTHER MISPAYMENTS.

The depositor may make a check payable to the bank's
cashier in order that he may use the money in a way previously
agreed upon. If the bank without the drawer's consent allows
the mohey to be used in a different. way, or to be withdrawn
2

Califf v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Super. 412. Whether the non-receipt of

the check by Mrs. Brown should have awakened suspicion in the drawer's

mind, was for the jury. A delay of six weeks after learning of the forgery
before notifying the bank, may be found by the jury too great. Cunningham v. First Nat. Bank, 219 Pa. 310.
2
ak21
Pa. 588.
26Parker

v. Hartly, 91 Pa. 465.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
after the purpose of the arrangement has been accomplished,
6
the bank will be liable to the depositor for the money."
NEGLIGENCE MUST CAUSE LOSS.

Negligence does not ifpso facto expose the drawer of the
check the name of the payee in which has been forged, to the
loss of his deposit, when the depository bank pays it, unless such
negligence would, should the depositor (drawer of the check) repudiate the payments, result in loss. A check was drawn by A

upon his bank, X, payable to B.

It was endorsed without

The
authority, with B's name, and presented to the Y bank.
it
and
also
endorsed
Y bank guaranteed the endorsement and
The
1901.
April
8,
on
the
X
bank,
to
for
payment
presented it
X bank paid it. Not until June, 1903 wasA informed, orbound
to know, of the unauthorized endorsement. A did not inform
the bank of the facts until April, 1906. The court, approving
a verdict and judgment for A against the X9 bank, observes
"there was not at the trial in the court below any attempt made
to produce evidence that the position of the First National Bank
[X, the defendant] had been altered for the worse between
June 1903, and the time of the bringing of this action, because
of the failure of the plaintiff to communicate directly to that
bank what Mrs. Brown (the payee whose name was endorsed
without authority) had said. The Athens National Bank [Y]
which had received the money from the defendant and was
liable over, in case the endorsement was without authority, had
immediate notice of all the plaintiff knew."2 7 If the negligence
in giving notice too tardily to the bank, that it has paid the
check upon a forged indorsement will injure the bank, if it is
denied the right to charge the check against the drawer's account, that right will not be denied to it. A draws a check to the
order of T, upon his own bank X. K obtains this check and endorses it in the name of T and his own, presents it to the Y
bank, and at K's suggestion (K being president of the Z bank)
gives credit to the Z bank for the amount. It is error to exclude evidence that between the time when the drawer of the
check (the depositor in the X bank) became aware of the forgery
and the time of its notifying the X bank (the defendant), a period
of six weeks, (bank T had become insolvent) that bank Y had

2'Califf v. First National Bank, 37 Super. 412.
Co. v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588.

Compare with McNeely
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had at the beginning of that period, funds in its hands belonging to Z sufficient to reimburse it for the money put to the
credit of Z, and that were bank Y compelled to pay back the
money to X, upon its warranty of the indorsement of T as it
might were X compelled to allow A's deposit to remain intact
it would suffer loss. Although Z had not endorsed the check, and
therefore was not liable as endorser to Y, it was bound to return
the money to Y, which had paid it under mistake concerning
the genuineness of the signature of T."
FORGED ENDORSEMENTS OF CHECKS. BANK'S RIGHT TO RECOVER.
WARRANTY.

When the holder of a check endorses it over to the bank
upon which it is drawn, or to another, he warrants the genuineness of all the prior endorsements, even that of the payee. The
drawee is not supposed to know the endorsements. "There
might be half a dozen endorsements of distinct persons, entirely
unknown to the bank and certainly the holder [who obtains payment from the drawee banks] must guarantee them to the bank
and not vice versa.9 "Every endorser," says the 66th section
of the act of May 16, 1901, an act relating to negotiable instruments, "who endorses without qualification warrants to all subsequent holders in due course," that the instrument is genuine,
and in all respects what it purports to be; that he has a good
title to it; that all prior parties had capacity to contract, and
that the instrument is at the time of his endorsement, valid and
subsisting. Sometimes a person who endorses a check or draft,
also expressly warrants the prior endorsements,' but probably
this adds nothing to the obligation arising from the mere act of
endorsing the instrument and procuring the money for it.
EFFECT OF BANK'S NEGLIGENCE.

The bank having paid the check to a bonafide purchaser of
it, after a forged endorsement of the payee's name, may recover
back the money paid such purchaser unless it has been negligent,
2Cunningham v. First Nat. Bank, 219 Pa. 310. If this case implies
that the X bank would suffer no loss because of its right of action on the
warranty of genuineness of the endorsement by the Y bank in the absence
of evidence of the insolvency of the Y bank, it is remarkable. It has the
risk of failure and expense of suit.
2Chambers v. Union Nat. Bank, 78 Pa. 205.
3OCaliff v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Super. 412. Cunningham v. First Nat.
Bank, 219 Pa. 310.

190
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and the recovery of the money would entail a loss on the purchaser. The negligence might consist in failure for an undue
time to discover the forgery, and to give notice to the person to
whom it had made the payment. But, the check having been
sent to the payee by mail, and stolen from the mail, and then
the name of the payee having been forged and payment of the
check obtained, failure on the part of the drawee bank for 17
days to discover the forgery, was not attributable to the fault
of the bank. If as soon as it made the discovery, it notified the
holder to whom it had paid the check, it could recover.3
Perhaps the check being payable to the cashier of a bank, or order,
the fact that the endorsement purporting to be that of the cashier was not in the usual manner, would make it negligent for
the drawee bank to pay it. But the court refused, the endorsement being "Pay to M. R. Rizer & Bro. or order, C. N. Jordan
cashier," to affirm a point to the effect that if the jury find the endorsement not made in the usual manner [the usual manner
does not appear to have been proved] and that the draft was of
a class very rarely put in circulation [the draft was by the cashier of one bank upon another bank, and was payable to the
cashier of a third bank] or received from private hands, it was
negligence on the part of the drawee bank to pay it without inquiry or remark, and the bank could not recover. Nor did it preclude a recovery by the bank, that immediately after defendant
had bought the draft, he showed it to the paying teller of the bank
on which it was drawn, and asked if it was good, and obtained
the reply, that it was good if the endorsement of M. R. Rizer
& Bro. was right. The trial"court properly declined to say that
the omission of the teller to say that the form of the cashier"
endorsement was calculated to excite suspicion would ptevent a
32
recovery.
LIABILITY OF BANK,

WHICH HAS

COLLECTED ON FORGED

ENDORSEIIENTS.

In Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers & Mechanics' Bank
the question is presented, can the payee of checks, which a
bank, not the depository bank, has paid to one who has forged
the payee's name as endorser, having collected it from the de31

Chambers v. Union Nat. Bank, 78 Pa. 205.

3

Id.

:3220 Pa. 1.
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pository bank, recover from it this money. The plaintiff received
checks from various persons, drawn on various banks. His
clerk, whose duty it was to collect these checks at the X bank
.(not the bank on which they were drawn) obtained possession
of checks and by means of a rubber stamp, endorsed them with
plaintiff's name, presented them at the X bank,* and received
the money. The X bank collected the checks from the various
banks upon which they were drawn, and had the money thus
collected, when the suit was brought. Plaintiff, having obtained
the checks again, in some way, presented them to the X bank
again, but the bank refused to pay. Liability was denied by
the court. As the drawee bank, having no contract With the
payee of a check, could decline, as to him,to pay it, a non-drawee
bank is equally exempt. "The action of the defendant," says
Mestrezat, J., "in- cashing the checks puts it upon no better
ground [for a recovery by the plaintiff] than if it had been the
drawee bank, and establishes no relations between it and the
plaintiff company that would warrant the latter in maintaining an
To the
action for the recovery of the amount of the check.'"''
contention that the defendant having received the money of the
plaintiff, on the checks, and the plaintiff having given credit to
its customers for the amounts of their checks, the defendant is
liable for money had and received for the use of the plaintiff,
the reply is, that defendant did not receive, in receiving the
amount of the checks, the money of the plaintiff or money for
its use. The money paid on the checks, was not the money of the
drawer of the checks; but of the banks that paid it. The drawers
of the checks continued liable upon them to the holder. The
money received by the defendant from the drawee banks may
be recovered from it by them. If the plaintiff's bookkeeper entered a'credit in its books, in favor 6f its customers, to the extent of the checks received, that credit is conditional. The
checks have not yet been paid, out of the funds of the drawers,
and if they are not hereafter paid, the credit may be rescinded.
LIABILITY OF BANK WHICH SELLS A DRAFT OR A CHECK.

A buys from bank B, a draft or check for $900, drawn upon
bank-C, and payable to Rebecca Vincent. She was then dead,
but A did not know it. The husband of Rebecca forged her
I'This is a tacit denial of the doctrine of Seventh Nat. Bank v. Cook,
7.3
Pa.,483.
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name to the check, and the money was obtained upon it from
T & Co. in Alabama. T & Co. transmitted it to bank C, which
paid it. A, having been compelled to pay $900 to the administrator of Rebecca Vincent, sued bank B. It was held that he
could not recover, because mistakenly believing Rebecca to be
alive, he had caused the check to be issued payable to her. "As
between two innocent parties, he who, by first acting, makes
loss possible, by inducing the other to act, must bear it." Another
reason for refusing to allow a recovery, is founded on the principle that A not having given notice to the bank, has exposed it
to loss, should he recover. He learned the death of Rebecca
Vincent in June 1893, three months after he purchased the
draft. He said nothing to the B bank until January, 1897. Had
he given prompt notice to the B bank, it could have notified the
drawee bank, C. It, in turn, could have notified T & Co. of
Alabama. If the B bank should now demand the money from
the C bank, it could reply (T & Co. having failed prior to notice
to the B bank) that notice had not been given it such as the law
requires. Thus argues Brown; J. He disapproves of the
reasoning of the Superior Court (17 Superior, 256) though
adopting its decision, which held that Rebecca Vincent's husband personated her, and the check, was intended for him. There
was therefore no forgery.!5 The case indeed is a simple one.
A tells bank B that he wants a draft for $900, payable to Rebecca Vincent. He pays the money for it, and gets it, that which
he asked for. How is B responsible for any misuse that somebody to whom A sends this draft, may make of it?
NOT A

FORGERY.

If X personates A in a transaction with B, which results in
B's giving X a check payable to A (supposed by him to be X)
and X endorses this check in the name of A, this endorsement
is not a forgery, and if X, having thus endorsed the check, deposits it in bank N, and N receives payment of it from the bank
upon which the check is drawn, that bank cannot recover the
money from N. A drawee bank can only recover, when it will
suffei a loss, if it does not recover; when, e. g., it will be unable
to obtain credit for the payment, as against the drawer's account. But if the drawer imposed. on by the personator, has
made a check payable to the personator, in the falsely assumed
35

States v. First Nat. Bank, 203 Pa. (is.
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name, and the personator endorses it, the depositor can not
successfully deny the right of the bank to be reimbursed from his
deposit. So if the check is drawn by the real estate department.
of a Trust Company, upon its banking department, the Trust
Company would have no right of action against bonafide purchaser of the check, if the payee intended by it, (though a personator) actually endorsed it. Hence, considered as a bank, it
could not recover from another bank to which it paid this
check.3" If a firm gives to a clerk a power of attorney to draw
checks against its account, and the clerk draws a check to a person having no .business relations with the firm, and he forges
the name of such person, and obtains the money from the bank,
the check is to be regarded as payable to bearer; the forgery of
the payee's name is insignificant. The bank is entitled to credit
against the firm. 7
UNAUTHORIZED CHECK.

A bank which pays a check, is entitled to credit as against
the depositor (a corporation) although, being drawn by its
treasurer, he intends to use the money for his own purposes.
The fact that the check has been taken, not from the check
book, and that the whole of it has been written, and that it has
been signed by the treasurer, whereas usually the secretary
writes and the treasurer signs checks of this corporation, is not
sufficient to defeat the bank's right to a credit for the payment.8
LIABILITY OF THE BANK TO DEPOSITOR.

The bank implicitly contracts with its depositor to pay out
the deposit, in parts or in one sum, to such persons as he shall
designate in writing; i. e., by checks. If it refuses, it exposes
itself to a double action, 39 to an action for the money on deposit
and to an action for damages. Nominal damages may in any
36

Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northampton Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230; 211

Pa. 211. But the application of this principle of personation, made by the
Superior Court, in States v. First Nat. Bank of Montrose, 17 Super. 256,was
disapproved, in 203 Pa. 69.
3T
7Snyder v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank 221 Pa. 599. It is immaterial
that the clerk delivered these checks to the proprietor of a "bucket shop;"
or that a trust company in which the checks had been deposited for collection, guaranteed the signatures of their depositors.
34Gunster v. Scranton. etc. Co., 181 Pa. 327.
39
First Nat. Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. 94; the statute of limitations
runs as against both actions.
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case be recovered" and also the damages shown to have been
actually suffered. Nor need the evidence be definite of the
amount of the damages suffered. For the refusal to pay a check
of $68, and another of $250, judgment on a verdict for $1,000
was entered, after a remittitur of $400 was filed." Substantial
damages may be recovered, although the bank's not honoring a
check was the result of an error in the account of the depositor,
made by the bank's clerk,of a wrong addition of a column.4' "The
mere fact," said Hare, P. J. "that he" the depositor "was
obliged to bring suit, if he ought to obtain any compensation,
the mere fact that he was disturbed in his business might be
reason to apply to the jury to give him compensation for it; but
the serious question is what is this injury, the real harm suffered. It has been said that the smaller the check [dishonored by
the bank] the greater the injury. I confess it does not strike
me in that light. It is altogether a question of circumstances."
In Patterson v. Marine National Bank,' the court without error
told the jury that if a bank, refusing to honor the check of the
depositor, X, pays out the deposit to another, who claims that X
was a mere trustee for him, and if in fact X was not a trustee of
the deposit for him, X is entitled to substantial damages. The
loss of credit by the depositor, from the bank's refusal to honor
his check, may be a ground for damages, without evidence of
some tangible pecuniary loss. The business of the community
says Paxson, C. J., would be at the mercy of banks, if only nominal damages were recoverable, in the absence of proof of special
damage, in consequence of their refusal to pay the deposits on
the checks of the depositor. A breach of its contract to pay on
check, entitles the depositor to substantial damages.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

The bank may be subjected to punitive damages, if the jury
find that it unnecessarily and unreasonably acted in disregard of
the right of the plaintiff [the depositor] and with partiality
'°First Nat. Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. 94.
"Birchall v. Third Nat. Bank, 15 W. N. 174. In Patterson v. Marine
Nat. Bank 130 Pa. 419, the verdict was for $300.
2
4' Birchall v. Third Nat. Bank, sufira. The verdict was for $1,000, in

which, reduced to $600 judgment was entered, although the judge said that
he did not think there was any special damage proved.
43130 Pa. 419.
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against him."

If the bank's conduct is wilful, if it delays to

make reparation, after dishonoring the check, exemplary damages are allowable; but when a mistake in casting up the account
of the depositor has been made, and as soon as discovered, all
possible reparation is tendered.45
NOMINAL

DAMAGES.

Nominal damages in any case, may be recovered, for the
dishonor of the depositor's checks, even when no actual damage
is shown."0
LIABILITY OF BANK TO DEPOSITOR.

When a man puts his money in the bank, the latter tacitly
agrees, if not expressly, to pay it out upon his checks, to others
or to himself, but not to pay it out upon the checks of others.
If, a check is drawn by another to which without his authority,
the depositor's name is affixed, such check is no justification
for the payment of the depositor's money, upon it. The
money paid upon it, will not be his, but the bank's, and, the
bank cannot withhold a corresponding amount of the deposit.
It must pay the sum deposited on proper demand, to the
depositor." This demand will be formally and regularly made
by his check, but the presentment of a check may be waived by
the bank, which will then become liable to suit, without the
check, if it declines to pay the money to the depositor. The
depositor's right to recover the deposit, does not depend on
proof of his suffering loss. There is no burden on him of showing that he will suffer a loss. The fact that he has obtained
some collateral security to reimburse him for acts of one who
may have forged his name to the checks which the bank has
paid, upon which however, nothing has been as yet realized,
does not preclude his recovering from the bank."8
WHAT PRECLUDES DEPOSITOR'S RECOVERY.

The depositor may by his negligence have betrayed the
bank into the payment of a check to which his name has been
4130 Pa. 419. The verdict being for $300, the court said the jury
"evidently did not award punitive damages." The deposit, which the bank
had paid to another than the depositor was $1,404.
1515 W. N. C. 174.
4117 Pa. 94.
"Robb v. Penna. Co., 3 Super. 255; McNeely Co. v. Bank of N. America,
221 Pa. 588.
48W. Philadelphia Bank v. Green, 3 Penny. 456.
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forged, o'r affixed without his authority. But the mere having
of a rubber stamp which imprints aname which is the facsimile
of the depositor's bank signature 9 is not such negligence. The
fact that some one improperly gets possession of this stamp
and uses it in the forgery of checks, does not visit the effect of
such forgery upon the depositor; does not justify the inference
of negligence in the custody of the stamp. A stamp was put
into a compartment of a fire-proof safe. This compartment was
locked and the key was put in a drawer in the safe, behind some
papers, and covered up. The drawer was then locked, and its
key put into another-but unlocked, drawer in the safe. The
safe was then locked, and its key was put in a little box which
was placed in a wooden drawer or box. This last was kept on
top of the safe. An office boy, 16 years of age, was employed
for errands and messages, including the sending of him to bank
to draw money on checks. There never had been occasion to
doubt this boy's honesty. The boy having without the employer's
knowlege, watched his moves in opening and closing the safe,
found the safe key, opened the safe, and then found the key of the
inner drawer, and gained access to the rubber stamp. By
means of this he forged checks. It was for the jury to say
whether in these acts, the employer was negligent in keeping
the stamp. The court properly declined to say that he was.
"He is not" says Rice, P. J. "an insurer against its [the stamp's]
unlawful use, but it may be conceded that he is responsible for
the consequences of his negligence in keeping it. He is bound
to exercise [i. e. bound to the depository bank] the care of an
ordinarily prudent man. '0
EFFECT OF BANK'S NEGLIGENCE.

Probably, if the bank was negligent in paying the check;
i. e. in not then discovering that it was forged, it cannot insist
on prompt subsequent discovery of the forgery by the depositor,
and upon prompt notice from him, to the'bank*5 ' It is probably not such negligence for the bank to honor a check which
has not been taken from the regular check book of the supposed
drawer, though his genuine checks are usually taken from such
9A signature left by him with the bank with which it may compare
signatures on checks, etc., purporting to be his.
5Robb v. Penna. Co., 3 Super. 255.
5t
ef. Peoples' Savings Bank v. Cupps, 91 Pa. 315.
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book. Nor is it negligence to honor a check which is both
written and signed by J, the treasurer of the depositor,a corporation, although the checks of the corporation have been usually
written by the secretary and signed by J, the treasurer. "The
signature of the depositor," says Mitchell, J., "is the essential
feature of a check, and a bank is not bound to pay any attention
to the handwriting of the other parts unless it shows something
to excite suspicion. Nor was there anything to put the bank
upon inquiry in the fact that the drafts were drawn to Jessup's
[the treasurer's] own order." 5' Possibly, if the forgery is unskillfully done, the bank's failing to detect it would be the result
of negligence. But negligence is not presumed, and the depositor who affirms it must show that the forgery ought not to have
imposed, would not have imposed, on the bank, had it exercised
proper care. "In the absence of any evidence, from the signatures themselves [which were not produced], or from witnesses,
that there was any difference between them and the plaintiff's
signature, which could be detected by the eye, it must be
assumed," says Sterrett, C. J., " that the forgery was of such
a character that the bank, acting with due care and caution,
was deceived by it.""'
ESTOPPEL

Besides the fact that delay in notifying the bank that the
checks it has paid are forgeries may cause it to lose a means of
recovering the money from the forger, etc., the failure to notify
it may beguile it into a recognition and payment of other checks,
forged by the same person, so that, as to these other checks,
the depositor would be estopped from contesting their genuineness with the bank.'
A series of forgeries extending over nearly three years being shown, it was shown that the depositor did not discover that
the first two of those returned to him shortly after they had
been cashed by the bank were forgeries, and, consequently, did
not notify the bank.
"No objection," says Sterrett, C. J.,
"having been made at the time of the first settlement, the bank
had a right to assume that everything was correct, including
the two checks purporting to be signed by him [the depositor].
5
"Gunster

v. Scranton, etc., Co., 181 Pa. 327.
53Myers v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1.
"Myers v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1.
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This silence was tantamount to a declaration to that effect, and,
in afterwards honoring checks signed by the same person, the
bank had a right to consider the fact that these signatures had
been at least tacitly recognized by the plaintiff [the depositor]
as genuine.""
OTHER

NEGLIGENCE.

The bank returns, at intervals, to the depositors, the checks
which it has paid, bearing his signature. He owes to it a duty
of examining these checks; of discovering whether they are
genuine or not, and, if not genuine, of giving timely information to the bank. Within a reasonable time after the return to
the depositor of the checks, it is entitled to a return of any that
may be forged or unauthorized, and if they are not thus returned,
the bank may keep a corresponding part of the deposit. In
Myers v. Bank,' the bank charged to the depositor's account
between March 26th and May 29th, 1891, two forged checks.
At intervals, until November 24th, 1893, it charged other forged.
checks. When the bank book was settled, May 29th, 1891, S,
the bookkeeper of the depositor, who forged these checks, called
on the bank, obtained the checks, returned to the depositor only
the genuine ones, and then, in order to conceal his wrongdoing,
made forged entries and forced balances in the depositor's books,
so that the balance appearing on the deposit book corresponded
with the apparent balance due by the bank. The depositor, in
each instance when the checks were returned, carefully examined the signature on the checks actually received by him, and
found them to be genuine. The forgeries were not discovered
by him until 1894. They amounted altogether to $13,090. In
an action by the depositor for this amount, these facts appearing,
the trial court properly instructed the jury to find for the defendant bank. The plaintiff was not chargeable with knowledge
of the forgeries, but he was clearly responsible for the acts and
omissions of his clerk in the course of the duties of receiving
the checks from the bank. The delivery of the checks, after
5Myers v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1.
56193 Pa. 1. In McNeely Co. v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588,
the clerk concealed his forgeries from his employer by a complicated and
ingenious system for six years. The referee found that the employer was
not negligent in not discovering the forgeries within that time. But the
depositor was negligent in not informing the bank for more than three
months after he discovered the forgeries.
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payment by the bank, to the clerk, was in law a delivery to the
plaintiff himself. The bank was entitled to have the checks
examined in a reasonable time. There is no finding of negligence
on the part of the plaintiff. There is, apparently, an absolute
right in the bank to have information in a reasonable time, after
return of the checks, if they are not genuine.
NEGLIGENCE IN

NOTIFYING THE BANK.

Although the depositor may not be negligent in the discovery of the fact of the forgery, after the return of his checks
by the bank, he may be negligent in revealing his discovery to
the bank. The bank has a right to quick notice; and, if it
does not receive such notice, it will have a right to retain the
depositor's money to the extent of the checks bearing his signature, though forged, irrespective of any actual loss that would
be suffered by it by compelling it to repay the depositor. If
early notified, the bank may proceed at once against the forger.
The forger may be solvent, or, even if he is insolvent, others
may come to his assistance who, after a delay, would not do so.
The burden is not upon the bank to show that it would have
recovered the money if it had been early informed of the
forgery. As an endorser is discharged, ipso facto, if not
promptly notified of the dishonor of the note by its maker, so
the bank is discharged, ipsofacto, if not promptly informed of
the forgery." Hence, a delay of nearly three months after discovering the forgery, in notifying the bank, will entitle it to
retain from the depositor, the money which it has paid out.
UNAUTHORIZED

PAYMENTS.

The bank may have agreed not to pay out moneys on checks
unless the checks are "properly witnessed."
Depositors have
a right to rely on such an agreement. If, therefore, the bank
pays out to the depositor's son the amount on deposit, on a
check not witnessed, and the check is a forgery, or the reception
of the money by the son was not authorized, the depositor may
recover the money from the bank." If A gives X general
authority to draw checks upon his deposit, thebank has a right
57McNeely Co. v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588.
-sPeoples' Savings Bank v. Cupps, 91 Pa. 315.

The payment by the

bank was made without comparison by the teller of the signature on
the check with that in the signature book. The notice of the intention to
withdraw the money, required by the by-laws, had not been given.
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to pay a check drawn by X, although X has drawn it with a
fraudulent intent, of which the bank has no knowledge. 59 The
fact that after X has, as attorney of A, made a check payable to
Z (a fictitious person) and endorsed the name of Z upon it, he
passed it on to M, who deposits it for collection with a bank,
which bank forwards it to other banks for collection, guaranteeing the prior endorsements, does not prevent the bank,,upon
which the check is drawn, from obtaining a credit for the payment as against A."
CHECK OVERDUE.

When a check becomes overduE, that fact is notice to the
drawee bank not to pay it. If there has been a failure of consideration for a check, or if it has been paid, but not taken back
from the holder, who subsequently passes it to another person,
or bank, and the drawee bank pays it above a year after it was
payable the bank cannot recover the amount paid from the
drawer,6 ' nor, his deposit being sufficient, charge the amount
against that deposit.
DUTIES

OF

COLLECTING BANKS

IN

SELECTING

SUB-AGENT.

When a check is deposited with a bank, drawn upon a distant bank, it is the duty of the former not to send it to the latter
but to send it to some agent to make the collection. The drawee
bank is not a suitable agent to demand payment from itself. Its
interest is to delay, instead of speeding, payment.62 If the
check is sent to the drawee bank, and, in consequence, payment
is not secured, which would have been secured, had the check
been sent to some other agent, the collecting bank will be liable
for the loss to the customer who has deposited it,3 and the
drawer will be discharged from liability to the holder."
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACT OF SUB-AGENT/r
In the absence of agreement modifying its liability, the
collecting bank, when the drawee bank is at a distance, is under
59Snyder v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599.
6OSnyder v. Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599.
61
Lancaster Bank v. Woodward, 18 Pa. 357.
2
' Bank v. Goodman, 109 Pa. 422; Hazlett v. Commercial Nat. Bank,
132 Pa. 118; Wagner v. Crook, 167 Pa. 259.
6Banks
v. Goodman, 109 Pa. 422.
6
'Wagner v. Crook, 167 Pa. 2.59.
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a duty to select a proper sub-agent. This sub-agent becomes
the agent of the depositor of the check, who cannot hold the
In
collecting bank liable for its negligence or misfeasances.
Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Third National Bank of Pitts
burg,' it appears that the collecting bank was held responsible
for the failure of the sub-agent to present a check for collection
when, had it been presented, it would have been paid.
DUTY OF DILIGENCE.

The lack of diligence of the collecting bank resulting in the
failure to obtain payment of a check from the bank on account
of its supervening insolvency will make it responsible to the depositor with it, of the check, for the amount thereof." The bank
may limit its duty. It may, e.g., undertake to collect only through
the clearing house. When it does so, it will not be liable for
the non-collection of the check, if not practicable through
the clearing house, although, had it gone to the counter of the
drawee bank, it could have obtained payment. A check on the
Penn Bank of Pittsburg was deposited in the A bank, for collection. The bank in East Birmingham, sent it to B bank in Pittsburg. The Penn Bank had then for seven days suspended payment. It was open however for an hour on the afternoon of the
same day. It was open the afternoon of the next day (Saturday),
and a part of the following Monday. Checks on the Penn Bank
were paid through the clearing house on Saturday but not on
Monday. This check was not sent to the clearing house on
Saturday, but on Monday, when it was dishonored. The clearings made on Saturday, were made before the Penn Bank
opened. Without knowledge or the means of knowing that that
DUTY TO ACCEPT ONLY MONEY.

In the absence of special agreement, the collecting bank's
duty is to accept in payment of a check only money; not a cashier's check of the drawee,' not a check of the drawee upon some
other bank. 0 If it accepts such substitutes for money without the
acquiescence of its customers, it will be liable to him for the

bank would resume payment on Saturday, there was no duty
on the B bank to send checks on it to the clearing house.'
6Bank v. Goodman, 109 Pa. 422; 5 Cyc. .502.
6165 Pa. 500.
67

Hazlett v. Nat. Bank, 132 Pa. 118.

6F. & M. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 165 Pa. 500. Settlement subse-

quent to the alleged negligence of the B bank, between it and plaintiff, had
been made through a series of years.
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amount of the check. But, the customer may acquiesce. H,
at Washington, Pa., mailed to the A bank in Philadelphia, his
check upon the Penn Bank of Pittsburg, for $5,000. The A
bank gave H credit for $5,000 as cash, and transmitted the
check directly to the Penn Bank. This bank received it May
21st, marked it "paid," charged the amount of it to the account
of H, and forwarded to the A bank its own check on the B
bank, its Philadelphia correspondent. About noon of March
21st, the Penn Bank suspended payment. The check on the
B bank reached the A bank on May 22nd, but payment was refused. The A bank at once wired H, the same day, that it had
received the check on the B bank, that that check was not good,
but that it would hold it subject to his order. H replied: "The
Penn Bank is all right, and their draft as mentioned will be
paid in a day or two. Please hold for a few days, and, if not
honored, return it to me." The Penn Bank opened for business on May 24th, and closed finally on May 26th. H, on June
2nd, explained to the A bank that, when he wrote, he thought
his own check had been returned. It had not been returned,
but had been kept by the Penn Bank. Paxson, C. J., says
that on the receipt of information that the Penn Bank had given
its check on the B bank, "the plaintiff (H) had then a right to
repudiate what the defendant bank had done, and hold it for the.
money. He did not do so. On the contrary, he wired the bank
as follows: * * * * It must be borne in mind that when
the plaintiff sent this telegram. he was in possession of all the
facts. * * * With this information he directed the-draft on
Philadelphia [check on B bank] to be held for a few days. He
cannot now complain of the delay. It was his own act and condoned the original negligence. 7' When the collecting bank fails
without negligence to obtain payment in money of the check it
may return it to the customer who deposited it. He may then
sue the drawer upon it. Or, perhaps, it could call on him after
notifying him that the check had not been paid in money, for
further instructions. If doing so, it followed these instructions, it
would not be liable."2
GNat. Bank v. Ashworth, 123 Pa. 212.
7
OHazlett v. Nat. Bank, 132 Pa. 118.
"Hazlett v. Nat. Bank, 132 Pa. 118.
7"Fifth Nat. Bank v. Ashworth, 123 Pa. 212. The check on the Penn

Bank was passed through the clearing house on May 21st, 1884, but was
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RELATION OF COLLECTING BANK.

When A having X's check drawn upon the M bank, deposits it with his own bank P for collection the P bank becomes
his agent. The mere fact that that bank credits him with the
check as cash, does not alter the relation. It is the almost universal usage to credit such collections as cash, unless the depositor of it, A, is in weak credit. If the check should not be paid,
it is charged off again and the unpaid check returned to the depositor." The bank can charge back the check, if it fails, without negligence, to obtain payment because of insolvency of the
drawee bank7 4 or if, having obtained payment, it is obliged to
pay back because the check has been "raised. " From the fact
that the collecting bank gives credit for the check to the depositor, he has no right to infer that it has been paid, ana if thus
inferring, he subsequently parts with value to the person from
whom he got the check, the loss arising from the fact that the
check is forged, etc., will fall upon him."8
not paid, the bank closing its doors on that day. It opened again on May
23rd (Friday) at 3 P.ii. It remained open all of Saturday, but finally closed
on the following Monday morning. The collecting bank sent the check to
the Penn Bank on Saturday, and received from it a cashier's check. The
check was delivered to the Penn Bank, when the cashier's check was givenby it. It was charged up against the drawer's account by the Penn Bank,
which still retained it. The cashier's check was sent to the clearing house
on Monday, and when it reached the Penn Bank that bank had finally
closed its doors, and shortly thereafter made an assignment for creditors.
Paxson, J., says that irrespective of any negligence of the collecting bank
in not sending the dishonored check through the clearing house on Saturday, it fixed its liability by giving up the check to the Penn Bank, and
accepting from the latter the cashier's check. This entitled the payee of
the check to consider it paid to the collecting bank, and to require the collecting bank to pay the amount of it to him. It was further said that he
could require payment of the whole amount, notwithstanding that he subsequently received a partial payment from the drawer.
73Hazlett v. Nat. Bank,-132 Pa. 118. Rapp v. Nat. Bank, 136 Pa. 426.
'132 Pa. 118.
75
Rapp v. Nat. Bank, 136 Pa. 426
76
Rapp v. Nat. Bank, 136 Pa. 426. Successive settlements between
banks, through a series of years after the alleged negligence, may preclude
the successful allegation of liability for that negligence.
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MOOT COURT.
PALMER V. SULLIVAN.
Conditional Contract-When Closed-Measure of Damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
In December, 1908, Sullivan asked Palmer to loan him $5,000 for one
year at 6 percent. agreeing to ,give as security a mortgage on a property
named. Palmer replied that he would make the loan if he found the title
of the property all right and if Sullivan would assure him that he would
take the money for the time and at the rate specified. To this Sullivan
agreed. The loan was to date from Jan. 1, 1909. Palmer employed an
attorney to search the title of the property, sold various stocks and bonds
netting him less than 6 per cent, paying broker's commission for selling them
and was prepared to deliver the money on Jan. 1st. In the afternoon of that
day, Sullivan called on Palmer and stated that he had found a man who
would lend him the money at 5 per cent. and that he had closed with the other
man. It would have cost Palmer $400 more to buy back the securities he
sold than the price he received for them, he having sold in a rising
market. Finding no other borrower, he deposited the money in bank at
3 per cent. where the money remained until Jan. 1,1910. Palmer now brings
assumpsit against Sullivan for $160 damages, $10 for searching the title
and $150 lost interest.
BROWN for Plaintiff.
BRUCE

for Defendant
OPINION OF THE COURT.

WOODWARD, J. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has confined
himself both in his argument and brief to the ascertainment of the measure
of damages. But before that problem requires solution we must determine whether there existed that contract for the alleged breach of which
the plaintiff now seeks to recoup himself. Three questions arise. Was
there a contract formed after the first conversation in December? Second:
If not. what was the status of the parties thereafter? Third: Did the acts
of Palmer in investigating the title and procuring the cash consummate-a
contract between the parties?
As to the first query, we are well satified that there was no contract
created by the preliminary negotiation. For there was no agreement which
had binding force on Palmer. And Palmer not being bound, Sullivan's
promise was without consideration and unenforceable.
Sullivan makes an offer to tender certain compensation and security
for the loan of $5,000. The acceptance of Palmer has two strings attached.
First: That Sullivan shall agree to take the money at the rate and for the
time proposed. Sullivan accedes. Second: That Sullivan's title shall be
found "all right." This is a matter to which Sullivan's acquiescence is im-
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material, because he is not the one to decide it. Hence there is no contract thus far. For "to constitute a valid contract there must be a mutual
assent to the same thing in the same sense: therefore an absolute acceptance of a proposal, coupled with any qualification .or condition will not be
regarded as a complete contract because there at no time exists the prerequisite mutual assent to the same thing in the same sense."-Bruner v.
Wheaton, 46 Mo. 363.
It will make it clear if we will consider the effect of the instant death
of Palmer. His executor or administrator is sued by Sullivan for breach
of contract. But the representative shows that Palmer never "found the
title of the property to be all right." Hence there was no contract and
accordingly no breach. And since Palmer is not bound, neither is Sullivan,
for it is "horn-book law" that where one party is not bound the other is not.
-Johnson et. al. v. Tressler, 7 Watts 48.
Authority as well as reason fortifies the conclusion that so far there is
no contract. "It has been held that there is no agreement where an acceptance varies an offer as to the time of performance, place of performance, price, quality, etc;" as where property is offered for sale and the acceptor stipulates that payment shall be made at his place of residence;
or where the offer is to buy a horse, and the offeree accepts, "if he will
come for it"-Cyc. 268; or where a person offers to make a quit-claim
deed for land and the offeree accepts on condition that he turnover certain
other deeds, Egger v. Nesbitt, 122 Mo. 667; or in a Pennsylvania case
where there was an acceptance of ce rtain oil property, "if the property was
as represented". Vincentv. Woodland Oil Co. 165 Pa. 402; or where an
offer to sell land is accepted "provided the title is perfecL"-Corcoran v.
White, 117 Ill., 118.
This brings us to the second point. What then, after the conversation,
was the status of the parties? We believe that their position was in effect
as though Sullivan had made a continuing offer to accept the $5,000 upon
the agreed terms at any time when Palmer signified that he "found the
title to the property all right." Or, in other words, Palmer had an option
to close the contract at any time he might inform Sullivan that he was
satisfied with the title, provided however Sullivan had not revoked the
standing offer.
This narrows the inquiry to the remaining element. Were the acts of
Palmer in investigating the title and procuring the cash, such as to amount
to an acceptance, and consummate the contract? There is no doubt but that
had Sullivan been notified by Palmer of the approval of the title, before
Sullivan took any further steps, the contract would have been sealed. Was
such notification requisite? We believe it was.
What did Palmer mean when he said he would make the loan "if he
found the title of the property all right?" Was this reserved condition one
of law to be tried by a court, or of fact for a jury, or a question as to what
title' would move the conscience of a chancellor to grant specific performance; or was it a question to be determined by a mental process of Palmer,
as to what title he would deem satisfactory to himself? There are "paper"
titles, "good" titles, "perfect" titles, "legal" titles, "equitable" titles,"market
able" titles, and other species of the genus titulus. There are titles which
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will be held good in a court of law which will not support a bill for specific performance in equity. What were the requisites of a title found to
be "all right," and who was to determine them?
"All right" is an idiomatic colloquial phrase, either adjectival or adverbial, expressive of satisfaction with, approval of, or assent to anything,
and equivalent to quite correct or correctly, satisfactory or satisfactorily, in
a satisfactory manner or condition: as, "your conduct or dress is all right."
-Century Dict.
"Right," as an adjective has been defined as meaning fit; suitable;
proper; correct, opposite to left."-34 Cyc. 1762.
"Right" as an adjective, "properly according with the conditions of the
case; fit; suitable; becoming."-Standard Diet.
Let us substitute for "all right" some of these terms. He would make
the loan if he found the title to the property "satisfactory;" "suitable;"
"fit;" "becoming;" "proper," etc. And who is to determine its suitability
or satisfactoriness? Palmer is thinking of safeguarding his own interests.
If "he" Palmer, is satisfied that the title is such that he will be entirely
secured in loaning the $5,000, then he will make the loan.- He expressly
stipulates that "he" is to be the judge.
And if, after examination, Palmer had decided that the title was not
"all right," he could have refused to make the loan, and Sullivan would
have been remediless. Probably, in this Palmer could not act out of mere
caprice, but if he acted in good faith, however trivial the supposed cloud
on the title, he was under no obligation. In Singerly v. Thayer, Thayer
agreed to put in an elevator "satisfactory in every respect." The elevator
being rejected after trial, Thayer recovered damages in the lower court,
but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the fair inference was that the elevator was to be satisfactory to Singerly, and while it
could not be rejected for mere caprice, yet a bonafide objection by him to
its working was a sufficient defence to the action.
Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 221.
Howard v. Smedley, 140 Pa. 81.
Boiler Works v. Schroeder, 155 Pa. 394.
Campbell Print Press Co. v. Thorp: 1 L. R. A. 646.
S)Cyc. 621.
Church v. Shanklin (Cal.), 17 L. R. A. 207.
And in Averett v. Lipscomb, 76 Vir. 404, where a purchaser bought
property upon the condition that if not satisfied with the title he need not
comply with the terms of sale, specific performance of the agreement was
refused. "It is immaterial," says Burke, J. "that this court now considers
that the vendors were and are able to make good title. That is not the
question. The contract left it for the purchaser to determine for himself
the matter of title. If, on examination, he was not in good faith satisfied
with the title he was not bound. The bargain was at an end."
Hence we conclude that the condition reserved by Palmer was to be determined by his own mental process. And when this process was complete,
if he wished to hold Sullivan he should have notified him. For, as quaintly
remarked by Brian, C. J., in Y. B. 17 Edw. 4-1, "it is trite learning that the
thought of man is not triable, for the devil himself knows not the thought
of man."
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Were the acts of Palmer in disposing of his stocks and bonds a sufficient evidence of his acceptance of Sullivans's offer? There is no evidence
that Sullivan knew of such transaction, or even that by inquiry he could
have ascertained such sale or that Temple's motive in selling the securities
was to procure money for the loan. He surely was under no obligation to
scrutinize Temple's conduct to discover whether the money would be forthcoming. An act may be the acceptance of an offer, but only where it is
the specific performance of that for which the offeror has stipulated. Had
Sullivan's proposal been, "If you sell your stocks in the A. ana B. companies, I will consider the contract closed," Palmer's selling of such stocks
would have been a sufficient acceptance.-Hoffman v. Bloomsburg Ry. Co.
[57 Pa. i74; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 61 Q. B. 696; 9 Cyc. 27r.
(Note).
But here Sullivan had no means of knowing what the decision of Palmer after an examination of the title was, or even that Palmer had examined it. It was contended that Sullivan knew that he had a good title and
therefore was bound to presume an acceptance. But his actions raise a
strong contrary presumption, viz: that after waiting in vain for an answer
from Palmer he doncluded that Palmer had discovered some flaw or cloud.
Therefore he sought elsewhere for the money.
Since his continuing offer was based on no consideration he could
revoke it at any time. He waited until the last day for Palmer, but Palmer
failed to communicate with him. Then he revoked the offer by negotiating
the loan elsewhere and notifying Palmer.
The answer to the third question therefore is, that Palmer's actions
didnot constitute an acceptance, or consummate the contract.-Emerson v.
Graff, 29 Pa. 358; Johnson et. al. v. Tressler, 7 Watts 48; Borland v. Guffy,
i Gran t 394; 9 Cyc. 271.
And we accordingly enter judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Sullivan asked Palmer for a loan upon a mortgage. Palmer then
offered a loan of $5ooo at 6 per cent interest, on two conditions: (a) that
he should find the title to the land good on which the mortgage was to be
placed; and (b) that Sullivan would undertake to take the money for the
time-one year-and at the specified rate, and give the mortgage. To this
Sullivan agreed. The loan was to be made no later than Jan. ist,
i9o9. We have here an offer by Palmer; an acceptance of it by Sullivan;
hence, a contract.
Neither Palmer bound himself to lend, nor Sullivan to accept the loan,
unconditionally. The lending was to take place if the title to the land
was found good. Palmer unconditionally bound himself to make the investigation, but what he should then do, was contingent upon the result of it.
This contingency is not inconsistent with the nature of a contract. Multitudes of agreements affected with similar 'contingencies have been treated
as contracts. Such contingencies have not been sufficient to prevent an
offer, affected by them, from being converted by acceptance, into an obligatory transaction; into a contract.
The search into the title would be made by an expert, who would not
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work for nothing. The expert actually employed by Palmer charged a fee
of $xo. It is easy to understand why Palmer would not undertake to have
the search made, until he got the promise of Sullivan to take the loan if
the result of the search should be to reveal the goodness of his title.
Conditional undertakings are not wanting in such mutuality as a contract implies. When the promises were exchanged, both parties.became
bound. Neither was as free as before. Before, Palmer could have parted
with his money, or not, whether Sullivan's title was bad or good; he could
have the search into it made or not, as he might choose. After, Palmer
was bound to make the search; and he was further bound, if the title was
"all right," to lend the money. If he had refused to make the probe, or
making it, and finding the-title "all right," had refused to lend the money, Sullivan could have recovered damages from -him. To this duty of Palmer,
that on Sullivan of taking the money, and paying 6 per cent interest on it
for one year, and of then repaying the principal, was reciprocal.
We are not bound, we think, to so interpret the phrases employed by
the parties, or to hold that Palmer put himself under a duty to lend, only
if he should in fact be satisfied with the title, after an investigation into it.
He probably had an interest in making the loan. The rate of interest
stipulated. was higher than the prevailing rate. There is no probability
that he was intending to retain an absolute discretion, whatever the result of his examination, as to making the loan, and even if he did have this
intention, we cannot discover an intention that Sullivan should understand that he was reserving such discretion. Sullivan was needing the
money so badly that he was willing to pay dearly for it. He would hardly
be content with an arrangement that would leave him irremediably uncertain until the arrival of Jan. 1st, 190.9, whether he would get the money or
not. The contract must receive the interpretation which Palmer knew that
Sullivan, under the existing circumstances, would place upon it.
The value of the mortgage would depend on the properties of the land,
its size, its locality, its fertility, its improvability, but it would also depend
upon the kind of interest Sullivan had in it. With the land, as such, Palmer was satisfied already. What he wanted to know was, whether as mortgagee he would get a good title in fee. Like any buyer of land he was
interested in the marketability of the vendor's, the. mortagor's estate. Evidently what the parties intended was, that the loan should be made, if the
title is marketable; was such as a vendee would be compelled to accept.
Whether a title was marketable or not, is an objective fact. It responds to
objective tests. It is not determined by the caprice, the discretion, the
option of the vendee. The facts pertaining to it are discoverable. They
can be apprehended by a jury or a court, and a jury or a court or both, and
not the parties, decide its value. We do not question that the parties
had in mind such tests. Palmer employed an attorney to find whether the
title was "all right." The attorney evidently found that it was.
But, even if Palmer had an uncontrollable discretion as to believing
whether the title was good or not, and therefore was under no obligation to
make the loan, he was under an obligation to make the search. He could
exercise his discretion only after the search was made. Had he refused
to make it, Sullivan would unquestionably have had an action for the dam-
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ages from the sequent refusal to make the loan, a refusal that could not
be founded, in that case, on a dissatisfaction with the title. This duty to
make the search, and to expend money in making it, was a sufficient support to a duty on Sullivan to accept the loan.
"Options" are well known forms of contract. For a price A may give
to B an option to buy land, a horse, a share of stock, at a designated price.
B has the right, but has no duty, to buy. A is bound by the will of B.
It would not be a distortion of the negotiation between the parties in this
case, to regard it as a purchase by Palmer at the price of the attorney's
investigation, of an-option to make a loan to Sullivan of $5,000.
We have reached the conclusion that a contract was made which imposed the duty on Palmer to have a search made into the title of Sullivan
to the land, and, on the result's being favorable to the title, to loan $5,000 to
Sullivan upon his tender of a proper mortgage, and which put on Sullivan,
the result of the search being favorable, the obligation to tender the proper
bond and mortgage, and to accept the money, pay 6 per cent interest for
one year upon it, and return it at the end of the year. It remains to discover whether anything has happened to discharge Sullivan from this duty.
The contract was made "in December, 1908.,, The loan was to date
from Jan. 1st, 1909, that is, as we conceive, it was to be made possibly before, but not later than a convenient time on Jan. 1st. The contract was
for the mutual advantage of the parties. It was virtually to sell money,
(if the solecism may be permitted) at a certain high price. Whether the
money should be lent, depended upon a fact which Palmer undertook to
discover. We think it was his duty, having discovered the title good, to
give notice thereof to Sullivan before the arrival of Jan. 1st, so that the
latter would be able conveniently to have his mortgage and bond executed,
in time to offer them early in that day, and further, to have the money ready
to deliver to Sullivan early on that day. In a contract fortheloan of money
by a certain day, time is "of the essence." The borrower specifying the
time, must be understood to need the money at that time. To get it 24
hours later might be useless to him. We think as the learned court below
intimates, that it was Palmer's duty to make the investigation of the title
promptly, and to apprise Sullivan of its result, in order that Sullivan's anxiety might be 'allayed, and that he might know that search elsewhere for
the money was unnecessary. The burden is on the plaintiff to negative
any undue delay; he has not done so. The afternoon of Jan. 1st, 1909
arrived, and Sullivan had heard nothing of Palmer's intention. Meantime,
anxious possibly, lest the decision would be unfavorable, he had sought
and found the money elsewhere.
Palmer had, it is true, apparently decided that Sullivan's title was good,
and that he would lend the money. In order to obtain the money, he had
sold various stocks and bonds, and "he was prepared to deliver the money
on Jan. ist." The learned court below appositely observes that Sullivan
was not bound to know-and it does not appear that hedidknow-of these
acts. Why he was kept in the dark for several days or weeks possibly
concerning a matter of vast importance to himself is not explained. It was
not unreasonable for Sullivan to expect notification before Jan. ist if Palmer should decide to deliver the money, and to infer, from -his not receiving.
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such notification, that Palmer had decided not to deliver it. He might, it
is true, have taken the trouble to inquire, but we cannot see that he was
under any duty to do so.
A word may not be inappropriate, concerning the measure of damages.
What we have said indicates that, in our opinion, Palmer can recover
no damages, because of his not having duly notified Sullivan of his decision. Had there not been this obstacle to a recovery, what damages should
be allowed? The investigation of the title was to be made by Palmer and
for his own benefit. Sullivan did not promise to pay for it.Palmer expected
to make a loan at 6 per cent interest, and therein was his motive. Palmer
however had a contract which secured him 6 per cent for a year. He
has been unable to make any other investment than a deposit in bank at
3 per cent. Had the suit been by Sullivan for Palmer's refusal to make
the loan, Sullivan would have recovered as damages the difference between
the interest which under the contract he would have paid, and the larger
interest which he was obliged to pay, on. borrowing the money elsewhere.N. Y. Life Ins. Co.v. Pope, 68 S. W. (Ky.), 85x; Turpie v. Lowe, 114 Ind.,
37. "It is clear," says Sedgwick, Damages (622), "that a contract to loan
money at less than the current rates of interest would give the right [to the
borrower) to substantial damages." Palmer who was to get 6 per cent interest, has been unable to obtain more than 3 per cent. He would be
entitled to $15o as damages if entitled to anything.
We close this too long decision with an expression of extreme satisfaction with the very lucid, learned, and ably conceived opinion of the learned
court below.
Judgment affirmed.

STEVENSON V. COAL COMPANY.
Deposit of CuIm on Land.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
In 1900 the X Coal Company erected a pile of culm near a stream on
which Stevenson was a miller. In 1905 an ordinary flood washed a quantity of culm into plaintiff's dam and over his land. Stevenson bought in
1903 and he began this suit in 1907. Plaintiff had already gotten damages from other coal companies who had culm piles at other points along
the stream.
COLLIER for Plaintiff.
FETTERHOOF for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
GROVER, J.-The plaintiff has already gotten damages from other
coal companies and brings this suit to recover damages from defendant
company, which he claims were caused by the negligent act of the X Coal
Company in erecting a culm pile so near a stream, on which plaintiff is a
lower riparian owner, that an ordinary flood washed the culm down in
plaintiff's dam and upon his land.
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That a coal company is liable to lower riparian owners who may suffer damages as a result of the company placing culmn or other refuse so
near a stream as to be washed down by an ordinary flood is supported by
abundance of authority: Little Schuylkill Navigation Company v. Richard's Admr., 57 Pa. 142; Elder v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., 157 Pa. 490;
Lentz v. Carnegie Bros., 145 Pa. 612; Gallagher v. Kemmerer, 144 Pa. 509.
That the plaintiff has already gotten damages from other coal companies which contributed to the injury can in no wise affect his case, for
in Gallagher v. Kemmerer, 144 Pa. 509, it was held that when an injury
as a whole to lands, is the consequence of independent acts of trespass
on the part of two or more persons, each act is a distinct cause of action
for the portion of the injury resulting from it, and together they do not
constitute a joint trespass. Other authorities to the same effect are,
Seeley v. Alden, 61 Pa. 302; Little Schuylkill Company v. French, 81 Pa.
336.
Had it required an extraordinary flood to wash the culm in plaintiff's
dam the result would have been different even though he had brought
his action at the proper time.
One may deposit culm on his own land where it will be safe from
encroachment by ordinary floods, and if washed away by an extraordinary flood he will not be liable for damages caused thereby.-Lentz v.
Carnegie Bros., 145 Pa. 612.
Another important question in this case is as to when the right of
action arose. Was it at the time the culm was erected by the X Coal
company or was it at the time the culm was deposited in plaintiff's dam
and upon his land. In reviewing the authorities we find it was at the
time when the culm was erected by the X Coal Company. And more
than six years have elapsed since that time. If the right of action arose
when the culm was erected and that statute continued to run up to the
time this action was brought, then the plaintiff's right to bring suit is
barred. But, if the right of action arose at the time the culm was deposited in plaintiff's dam then he is in time and may recover.
It is a well settled rule of law that the right of action occurs when
the culm is erected near the stream and not when deposited in plaintiff's
dam as claimed by him. In Little Schuylkill Navigation Company v.
Richard's Admr., 57 Pa. 142, the court said, the right of action began
with defendant's act upon his own land. This is the tort, while the deposit
in the basin below, is only the consequence. Another authority to the
same effect is Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474.
In Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U. S. 772, it is held that when the statute of
limitations begins to run, it will not be arrested by any subsequent disability; and a party claiming the benefit of its exceptions, can only avail
himself of the disability which existed when the right of action first
accrued. There being no disability that plaintiff could take advantage of,
he can claim no exception. When he bought the land he took it subject
to all existing equities between his grantor and the X Coal Company,
and it must be presumed that he knew of the culm near the stream when
he purchased, and even though he had no such knowledge it will avail
him nothing, for in Noon v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, it is held that though
one may be ignorant of his rights, yet the statute will run against him.
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Williams on Real Property, Vol. 2, at page 252, says, that if there be
several adverse occupants the last may tack the possession of his predecessor to his, so as to make a continuous adverse possession for the
period required by the statute, provided there is a privity of possession
between such occupants, Here there are such occupants. Here there is
privity. Another authority to the same effect is Schrack v. Zubler, 34
Pa. 38.
Under all the circumstances of the case, we conclude that the plaintiff's right of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The decision of the learned court below is revolutionary. It amounts
to the proposition that where one does upon his own land an act which
may in the future cause injury to another the statute of limitations begins
to run from the time the act is done and not from the time the injury
occurs.
If this is the law in regard to the piling of culm, it would apply to
other acts as well. Applying this doctrine it would be necessary to hold
that if a man procured and kept a vicious dog which subsequently bit
some one the statue of limitations would begin to run at the time the
dog was first procured. It would be necessary to hold that where one
built an unsafe sidewalk which caused another to fall, the statute would
begin to run from the time the sidewalk was built and not from the time
of the fall. If the right of action arises at the time the sidewalk is built
in whose favor does it exist? In favor of every inhabitant of the town?
or ward? or resident of the street? What is the measure of damages?
If the right of action arises when the culm is piled near the stream,
in whose favor does it arise? A flood may wash the culm upon the land
of any one of a number of riparian owners. Does a right of action accrue
to each of the owners as soon as the culm is piled? What would be the
measure of damages in such an action? Would it be a bar to subsequent
action to recover damages for the injury actually done when the culm
was washed down? Has such an action ever been brought in the courts
of Pennsylvania?
The difficulties presented by these questions have convinced us that
the doctrine announced by the learned court below is erroneous and that
the statute of limitations began to run only when the culm was deposited
in the dam and over the land of plaintiff.
It may be that this is in conflict with the decision in Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474. This court does not intend to extend the operation of this
decision. In Noonan v. Pardee the court said that the cause of action
was the failure to afford sufficient support and that it arose when the
coal was removed without leaving sufficient support. The objection to
this decision is that the support was sufficient up until the time the "cavein" occurred. As soon as the support became inadequate the "cave-in"
would follow as a necessary consequence.
In A. & E. Encyc. Vol. 19, p. 195, the law is stated as follows: "Where
the act complained of might or might not be injurious and the plaintiff's
right of action must depend upon its proving injurious the cause of action
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cannot be considered as accruing until the injury has developed and until
then the statute does not begin to run."
In 25 Cyc. 1135, it is said:
"The test to determine when the statute begins to run against an
action sounding in tort is whether the act causing damages does or does
not of itself constitute a legal injury, that is, an injury giving rise to a
cause of action because it is ap invasion of some right of the plaintiff.
If the act is of itselfnot unlawful in this sense, and the plaintiff sues to
recover damages subsequently accruing from, and consequent upon the
act, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when and
only when the damages are sustained; and this is true, although at the
time the act is done it is apparentthat injury will inevitably result. But
if the act of which the injury is the natural sequence is of itself a legal
injury to the plaintiff, a completed wrong, the cause of action accrues
and the statute begins to run from the time the act is committed, be the
actual damage however slight and the statute will operate to bar a
recovery not only for present damages but for damages developing subsequently and not ascertainable at the time of the wrong done, for in
such case the subsequent increase in the damages resulting gives no new
cause of action."
In support of the first part of the statement Hanna v. Holton, 78 Pa.
334, may be cited. The facts were as follows: Plaintiff in 1860 assigned
to defendant as collateral security for a loan a judgment against J, which
expired 1863. Defendant neglected to revive the lien and in 1866 J sold
his land, so that the lien was lost. J was solvent at the time of the
sale but afterwards became insolvent. It was held that the statute of
limitations began to run from the time of the sale and not from the time
when the lien expired.
It is true that the statute of limitations begins to run from the time
the cause of action accrues. But when did the action accrue in this case?
The act of the defendant was the piling of the culm on his own land, but
that, in itself, alone did not harm the plaintiff. The plaintiff could not
sue for damages for that though he might have asked for injunction relief.
Later on damage is done the plaintiff by the washing down of the culm.
The piling of the culm was the remote or primal cause,-the causa causans-in the line or process of the production of the injury; but the overflow consequent upon it is the direct cause of harm-the gravamen of the
action. We hold therefore that the cause of action accrued and the statute began to run when the damage was sustained by the plaintiff and not
when the causes were first set in motion ultimately producing injury as
a consequence.
Judgment reversed with a v. f. d. n.

COMMONWEALTH V. GOLIGHTLY.
Larceny -Passing

Counterfeit Money-False Pretense.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Farley, a livery stable keeper, instructed his hostler, Lightner, to
take a certain horse to NewVille and sell it to Golightly, provided that
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Golightly would give two hundred dollars in cash. Golightly tendered
Lightner counterfeit money for the horse and after being assured by
Golightly that it was good money Lightner delivered the horse to Golightly.
Golightly immediately took the horse to Carlisle and sold it.
REICHELDERFER for Commonwealth.
UMBENHAUER for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
HANKEE, J.-This is an indictment for larceny. According to
Trickett on Criminal Law in Pa. (Vol I, page 2) "Larceny is tl~e wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying away by any person -of the mere
personal goods of another, from any place with a felonious intent to convert them to his (the taker's) own use and make them his own property,
without the consent of the owner".-1 Crim. L., section 862.
In 11q Pa. 254, Com. v. Eichelberger, it is held, that if by means of
any trick or artifice the owner of property is induced to part with the
pssession only, still meaning to retain the right of property, the taking
by such means will amount to larceny provided it be done animofurandi.
But if the owner part with not only the possession of the goods, but the
right of property in them also, the offence of the party obtaining them
will not be larceny, but the offence of obtaining goods by false pretence.
According to the facts of this case, we do not know whether Golightly,
the defendant, knew that the money he tendered was counterfeit, at the
time he offered it, or whether it was discovered to be counterfeit after
the transaction had been completed. But even admitting he knew it at
the time, according to the above-cited case, he would not be guilty of
larceny, because the owner, through his agent, parted with the possession and right of ownership when the money was paid. If the possession
and title to personal property are voluntarily given to another, no matter how gross the fraud by which the owner may have been persuaded to.
do so, there is no larceny. This principle was recognized in 2 Phila. 385,
where it is said that, "if he consent to abandon his property in article
though he may have been deluded by gross fraud, the taking is not larceny. "
In this case, it is true that, admitting the defendant knew the money
to be counterfeit, he deceived the vendor, but, nevertheless, he obtained
his consent to an absolutesale, and possession of the horse was delivered to
him accordingly. There was no condition in the case. The prosecutor
might argue that it might be equally criminal to prevail on the owner to
part with the property in as well as the possession of goods, by fraud
and falsehood, but the law does not furnish actions according to the
degree of immorality.
The prosecutor might argue that the consent of the vendor was
fraudulently obtained and therefore in law was no consent; and the defendant, without paying for it, was guilty of larceny. In 15 S. & R., 92
Lewer v. Com. it is held: "It is not constructive larceny, if one by fraudulent means induces another to part with the property in goods and to
"When the owner of goods
deliver the possession of them absolutely."
is induced by fraudulent representations to part not simply with the pos-
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session but with the ownership, and possession is given in consequence
of this intention to part with the ownership, the taking of the thing is
not larceny, but the obtaining of goods by false pretences.-Trickett on
Pa. Criminal Law, Vol. I, 388. The jury will therefore render a verdict
in favor of defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The transaction between Farley and Golightly was a sale of the
horse for $200. Farley intended to sell; GQlightly intended to buy. The
possession of the horse was given to Golightly, as the buyer, in execution, in part, of the sale. The crime of Gclightly, therefore, if crime he
committed, was not larceny.
He delivered counterfeit money to Farley's agent, in payment of the
horse. Did he know that it was counterfeit? If he did, and the money
was coin, he violated the 160th section of the act of March 31st, 1860,
I Stewart's Pardon 922; which declares that any person who passes or
puts off any counterfeit coin "knowing the same to be false or counterfeit," shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. If the money purported to be
national currency or bank notes, the passing of it, with knowledge that
it was fictitious, was also a misdemeanor.
If the passing with knowledge of false money is not exclusively punishable by the statutes, the passing thereof in the effecting of a purchase
would doubtless be an obtaining of the thing purchased by false pretense.
"The passing of counterfeit money," says McClain, I Crim. L. 681, "is an
offense in itself, and is perhaps not punishable [for thatreason, he means]
as a false pretense. But if the bill or coin does not really purport to be
money, but is only in semblance of money, then the use of it might constitute the offence of false pretense. Undoubtedly the use of counterfeit money, whether coin or bank bills, would in every instance, be a
false pretense unless it is punishable as a higher crime." Cf, also, 2
Wharton Crim. L. 69.
It does not appear, however, that Golightly knew that the money he
tendered for the horse was counterfeit. He could therefore not be convicted of either passing counterfeit money, or of obtaining the horse by
false pretenses. Knowledge of the falseness of the pretence is indispensable to its criminality.-1 Trickett Crim. L. 59.
The learned court has properly held that there could be no conviction of larceny.

COMMONWEALTH V. TALBOT.
Larceny-Theft of Note-Maker's Equities no Defense.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
William Brainard obtained from Harry Tanden a note for $500, payable to Brainard by falsely representing to Tanden, who was illiterate,
that it was a notice to Tanden's tenant to vacate premises. Brainard
assigned this note for $475 to Alford, who had no knowledge of the cir-
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cumstances under which it was procured. Talbot took the note from Alford
without Alford's knowledge. He is now on trial for larceny of the note.
Defendant asks the court to charge the jury that there can be no conviction.
SMITH for Plaintiff.
PUDERBAUGH for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
ROOKE, J.-This was an indictment for larceny and the defendant
asks the court to instruct the jury that there can be no conviction.
In order to ascertain whether the defendant can be convicted of the
crime charged, it will be first necessary to ascertain what larceny is.
Larceny has been defined to be the taking, by trespass, of property
which belongs generally or specially to another, with the intent to deprive
the owner thereof permanently.
The defendant's contention is that, owing to the fraud of the payee
in procuring the note, Alford acquired no property right in the note of
which he could be deprived by the defendant.
To give Alford a right of action against Tanden, he must be a bona
fide purchaser for value, before maturity, and without notice of any defect in Brainard's title, as we must assume that this was an ordinary
promissory note and in the usual form.
Notice of defect, according to section 56 of the negotiable instruments act of 1901, is defined as follows: To constitute notice of the infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it,
the person to whom it is negotiated must have actual notice of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts, that his action in the taking
of the note amounts to bad faith.
While the facts do not state the period for which the note was to run,
we assume that Alford purchased the note before maturity. It is also
evident that he paid value ($475) for it, and had no knowledge of the
defect in Brainard's title. He was, therefore, a bona fide purchaser, for
value, before maturity, and without notice.
It is well settled by the authorities in Pennsylvania, that a person
who has been induced to sign a note by the fradulent misrepresentations
of the payee or of a third party, cannot set up such fraud as a defense,
to defeat a recovery by a bona fide purchaser for value, before maturity,
and without notice. -Rothermal v. Hughes, 134 Pa. 510; Phelan v. Moss,
67 Pa. 59; Moorhead v. Gilmore, 77 Pa. 122; 84 Pa. 446.
It is clear from the above that Alford had a right of action against
Tanden on this note and consequently a property right in the said note.
At common law one could not be convicted of larceny for the taking
of a note. This, however, was remedied in Pennsylvania by the act of
March 31, 1860, the provisions of which are as follows: "If any person
shall steal any bank-bill, note, check, draft etc., he shall be guilty of
larceny."'
In Commonwealth v. Yerkes, 119 Pa. 269 the Court said: "Our criminal code, section 104, has expressely made it larceny to steal checks and
other securities, so that at the present time, a check is as much property
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as a horse or a bale of goods and is to be treated, not as a mere piece of
paper, but as a representative of money, which it calls for, and of a corresponding value. This case is to be considered precisely as if the defendant, instead of obtaining a check, had obtained the money from the city
treasurer. The moment a maker has filled out a check and signed it so as
to enable the holder to draw the money which it calls for, its value attaches and it becomes property, the stealing of which is larceny."
The question of the stealing of checks and notes being included by the
legislature in the same paragraph of the same act, it is manifest that what
the learned judge above states in regard to checks is equally applicable,
in the present case, to this note,
Alford, having a property right in this note, was deprived of the
same by Talbot and in view of the authorities above cited, the court declines to charge the jury that there can be no conviction.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The
The defendant is on trial for the taking of a "note for $500."
act of March 31st, 1860, declares that any person who shall "steal any *
note * * * * or promissory note for the payment of money
shall be deemed guilty of larceny."
But it is said that the note must be at the time of the taking, a
legally valid and subsisting security for the payment of money (1 Wharton, Grim. Law, 767) or that it must be such that it will become a security by the act of passing from him to another.-1 Wharton Crim. Law
768; 1 McClamn Grim. L., 534; Cf. Sylvester v. Girard, 4 R. 185; Wilson
v. Porter (Ala.) 118.
Was the Tanden note in the hands of Alford, a valid security? Itwas
executed by Tanden, who was illiterate, by a representation that it was
a notice to his tenant to vacate certain premises. It is clear that Brainard could not have enforced payment of it. -Schuylkill County v. Copley,
67 Pa. 386; MeAboy v. Johns, 70 Pa. 9; 3 P. & L. Dig. Decisions 4040.
Brainard "assigned" the note to Alford. It does not appear that he
endorsed it. "An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from
one person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the
holder thereof. If payable to *: * order it is negotiable by the indorsement of the holder, completed by delivery."-Negot. Inst. Act of 1901,
§ 60. "Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order, transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee
such title as the transferrer had therein,,and the transferee acquires, in
addition,* the right to have the endorsement of the transfer. But, for the
purpose of determining whether the transferee is a holder in due course,
the negotiation takes effect as of the time when the endorsement is actually made. "-Negot. Inst. Act, of 1901. § 79. Brainard has never indorsed
the note, and hence Alford has merely the rights which Brainard had;
that is, he could not have compelled the payment of any thing.
But, even had Brainard endorsed, we are inclined to think that Alford's right would have been no better than Brainard's. Fraud, like
duress, failure of consideration, etc., is, in many of its forms, onlywhat
is known, sometimes as an equity, as a personal defence; good against
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endorsees with notice, or who have paid nothing for the note, but bad
against endorsees bona fide and for value. That form of fraud, however
which consists of misrepresentation to an illiterate person, of the import
of the paper according to which it is not a negotiable instrument and the
securing of his execution of it, without his being negligent, by reason of
this misrepresentation, is held in some jurisdictions to constitute a real
as contrasted with a personal, defence, that is, to be available against
any holder, although bonafide and for value.-Foster v. Mackinnon, L.
R. 4 C. P. 704; Bigelow, Bills, Notes & Checks, 205; 1 Daniel, Negot.
Inst. 859 et seq. This principle has been applied in this state, in Mercur
v. Schwankie, 4 Leg. Gaz. 99; 14 P. & L. Dig. Decisions, 23758.
It does not, however, seem to be necessary that the instrument stolen
should be capable of being enforced. A bank or other note or check
before issue may be stolen. Its enforceableness subsequently arises if at all,
but an action by any body can be defeated by proof of the theft. Yet it
has been held larceny.-Com. v. Yerkes, 119 Pa 266; 1 McClain's Crim.
L. 534; 1 Wharton 768. The wrong done by such larceny, is in exposing
the maker of the note to the risk of a successful action. The stealing of
contracts, receipts, etc. is made larceny, for the reason evidently that it
will embarrass parties who desire to enforce rights, or defend against
claims, in establishing such rights or defences. The note stolen by the
defendant primafacie proves its holder entitled to money from the maker.
The holder has a right to it, as evidence of his demand. Whether he
will succeed on it or not, ought not to be litigated in a prosecution for the
theft of it. He has been deprived of the power to use it as evidence of
his claim. He has been put to the risk 'of losing this claim-whether
disputable or not ought not to matter-by its reaching, without his cooperation, a bonufide purchaser from the thief. It ought to have been,
it probably was, the aim of the legislature, in criminalizing the stealing of
receipts, letter-books, etc., to protect the possession of the persons having
such instruments of proof, from thd loss of it, and the criminalty of the
act of taking them ought not to depend on the opinion which the court
may form, in the trial of the indictment, as to whether, had the thefts
not occurred, the party from whom the docunment was stolen, would or
would not have prevailed by means of it in a civil action upon it. The
cases are not harmonious, and they exhibit no consistent principle. The
right of Alford to contest thevalue of Tanden's alleged defence had value,
and if it was the legislature's intention to protect this right, from embarrassment by theft, its intention would be sensible. We shall impute to
it such an intention.
Judgment affirmed.

O'BRIEN V. BARNETT AND C. V. R. R.
Right of Stoppage in Trans-a-Transfer of Bill of Lading -Bona
Fide Holder.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Barnett sold a lot of goods to Cope on credit of thirty days.

He
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shipped the goods by freight consigned to Cope or order and mailed Cope
the bill of lading. On the arrival of the bill of lading, Cope went to
O'Brien and offering the bill of lading as security, asked for a loan of
$500 for sixty days. The loan was made but O'Brien first inqeduir
whether the goods were paid for. Cope stated that they were not paid
for and further that he did not think he ever would pay for them. Cope
further stated that he owed his wife $500 and that he was borrowing this
sum from O'Brien that he might square accounts with her. Cope was
not insolvent at this date but the next day he suffered a heavy loss by
fire and the day following he made an assignment for the benefit of his
creditors. Barnett notified the carrier to hold the goods. O'Brien, the
endorsee of the bill of lading brings replevin.
WOODWARD for Plaintiff.
ZERBY for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COHEN, J. -The first point to be considered by this court is as to
whether a consignee can pass title to property by the delivery of the
bill of lading. It is a well settled principle of law that the consignee can
pass a good title by indorsing his bill of lading over to another and the
act of 1866, Stuart's Purdon's Digest, 393, Vol. I, says, in substance,
that bills of lading shall be negotiable and may pass title, and in 89 Pa.
155, and 87 Pa. 525 it is held that bills of lading pass title to goods in
transit as effectually as if the goods themselves ware delivered. "The
endorsement of a bill of lading by factors or consignees is as effective as
that of the vendor in giving validity to any contract or agreement by
way of pledge, lien or security bona fide made by any person with such
vendee or agent, as well for any original loan, advance or payment made
upon the security of such goods or documents (including bills of lading)
as also for further advances, and such dontract or agreement shall be
Benjamin on
binding upon and good against the owner of such goods."
Sales, Vol. II pages 1101-1102. Therefore the plaintiff in this case took
good title to the goods.
Did the right of stoppage in transit cease when Cope assigned the
bill of lading to O'Brien, the plaintiff ? If O'Brien was a bonafide purchaser for value of the bill of lading then it is the opinion of the court
that the right of stoppage in transit had ceased to exist. Benjamin on
Sales, Vol. II, page 1101, gays "the right of stoppage will be defeated by
the assignment of the bill of lading" and this is the doctrine of 86 N. Y.
167 and Schumacker v. Ely, 24 Pa. 521, provided that the assignee is a
bonafide purchaser for value.
The only question that remains is whether O'Brien was a bona fide
purchaser for value of this bill of lading. We think that O'Brien was a
bon fide purchaser for value without notice. Mr. Benjamin, in his work
on Sales, page 1110, says in his remarks concerning bills of lading, "the
transfer of a bill of lading in order to affect the vendor's right of stoppage in transitumust be, both by atatute and by common law, to a bona
fide third person" and adds "this means not without notice that
the goods have not been paid for because a man may be perfectly
honest in dealing for goods that he knows not to have been paid for, but

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
without notice of such circumstances as render the bill of lading not fairly
and honestly assignable."
Now there is no doubt here that the plaintiff
acted honestly, for at the time he took the bill of lading he paid full value
and he knew that Cope was perfectly able to pay and knew that Cope
was solvent and could have been forced to pay at that time. True, the
vendee, Cope, made certain remarks as to not having paid, nor would he
pay for the goods, but it was not incumbent upon the plaintiff to heed
those remarks, nor does that show an element of fraud. "Mere knowledge on the part of the transferee that the buyer has not paid for the
goods will not defeat his right as against the seller. "-26 A. & E. Encyc.
1111, also held in Shepherd Morse Lumber Co. v. Burroughs, 62 N. J. L.
469. There evidently was no fraud in the transfer for surely O'Brien
had no reason to know that Cope would become insolvent and it was only
through force of circumstances that Cope was compelled to make an
assignment for the benefit of his creditors. For who can tell when fire
may cause the insolvency of a person? We think that O'Brien acted
with all the fairness, .honesty and prudence that one could expect, and is
such a bona fide holder for value as to give him a superior equity as
between the parties here.
We do not consider it necessary for the court to inquire into the fact
as to the disposition of the $500 that the plaintiff gave to Cope, for that
is immaterial. It would be disastrous to all commercial transactions to
hold a lender to a responsibility to see that the use of the money loaned
was a proper or even legal one and it was not the duty of O'Brien to find
out to what use that money was put.
We have arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff in this case acted
innocently and was a bona fide purchaser for value within the meaning
of the law governing the transfer of bills of lading.
And therefore judgment is entered for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
That the title of Cope passed to O'Brien, for the purpose of a security, is well shown by the learned court below. The goods may have
been worth $1,000. Theywere transferred as a species of pledge, for the
repayment of a loan of $500. Cope's right to the possession of them,
whatever it was, passed to O'Brien.
The goods were still in transitu when Cope became insolvent. The
vendor could then have stopped them, but for'the prior transfer of them.
That prior transfer prescinded the right of stoppage, if O'Brien was a
bonafide purchaser for value. -Tiffany, Sales, 333. He was a purchaser
for value. He lent $500 on the security of the goods. Did he purchase
them bona fide?
The goods had not been paid for by Cope, but this gave no right of
stoppage, even as against Cope afortiori,as against O'Brien. O'Brien's
knowledge of the fact would not put him in a worse plight than Cope's
knowledge of it.
Was the sale to Cope voidable by the vendor for any other reason
than his insolvency, and that he had not paid for them? While the negotiation of a bill of lading is equivalent to a negotiation of the goods, it is
not better than the latter. If, at the time of the transfer by Cope, Bar-
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nett had a right to rescind the sale, and the facts conferring this right
were made known to O'Brien when he made his loan, the right of rescission would be available against O'Brien.
The goods had not been paid for and O'Brien knew so. But the nonpayment would not justify a rescission as respects Cope, nor the knowledge of it, as respects O'Brien.
Cope told O'Brien not only that the goods were not paid for but that
he "didn't think he ever would pay for them," that he was not designing
to use the money he obtained from O'Brien, in paying for them. May
we infer from this that he intended, at the time of buying from Barnett,
not to pay him? Hardly. Not to think, a week after buying goods, that
one would ever pay for them, though then able to pay for them, would
justify a suspicion, at least, that the intention not to pay for them was
then present, and this would warrant the suspicion that if present then,
it was present when the sale was made. But it would scarcely authorize
more than a suspicion.
When A inquires of B the price of a thing, and says he will take it at
that price B, if unsophisticated by the lore of lawyers, will think that
A intends B to believe that he is promising to pay the price. That intentions are important is witnessed by thousands of events. Many acts are
criminal solely because of the intent. The intent to do an act at a future
time, is recognized in the criminal law, as well as the civil, as making it
more or less probable that the act will be done. The ordinary lender of
money thinks that if the borrower intends, at the time of borrowing, to
repay the loan, he will be more apt to do so, than if he does notso intend,
The lender would in few cases, make the loan, if he knew that the borrower either intended not to repay him, or did not intend to repay him.
When a man misrepresents his intention to pay, he misrepresents a
material, a very material fact. If the purposed misrepresentation of
other material facts is a fraud, so is that of intention. The hair-splitting
discussion of Lowrie, J., in Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367, may have satisfied himself with its astuteness. It hardly imposes on the sane and unperverted moral sense and judgment of men who are not professional casuists. "The intention not to pay is dishonest," says the Justice, "but it
is not fraudulent." A consolatory distinction surely! Something might
have been said for the doctrine that to know that when one purchases
goods on credit he is insolvent, is not the same as to intend not to
pay for them, for insolvent men make many payments, and the buyer
who buys goods for the purpose of selling them, may intend from the proceeds of their sale, to pay for them, even though he is insolvent: In
Rodman v. Thalheimer, 75 Pa. 233, the doctrine laid down is that "insolvency and the knowledge of it" at the time of a purchase on credit is not
a fraud for which the sale can be annulled. The strictures of Justice
Mitchell in Baughman v. Central Bank, 159 Pa. 94, on the doctrine of
Smithv. Smith are apt and deserved, and it is a pity that the cpurt lid
not feel then disposed to banish it from the law of an honest state. In
1837 Rogers, J. was convinced "that when a person purchased goods with
a preconceived design of not paying for them, it is a fraud, and the
property of the goods does not pass to the vendee."-Mackinley v. Mc-
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Gregor, 3 Wh. 369. Lowrie, J., might well have been convinced of it in
1853, as Mitchell, J., was in 1893.
We should have held in the interest of fundamental honesty that had
it appeared that Cope, when he bought the goods, intended not to pay for
them, Barnett could have rescinded the sale, and that this right of rescission would avail against O'Brien, if when he bought from Cope he
knew of the fraudulent attitude of Cope in his dealings with Barnett.
The evidence is not clear of the existence of the knowledge of this attitude. The learned court below has reached a proper decision, supported
by a clear and terse opinion.
Judgment affirmed.

PURDON V. KRESS
Trespass-Drunkenness-Personal Injury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Kress was returning home on Nov. 1st, 1909 in an intoxicated condition. He fell in front of the gate to Purdons's yard and finding himself
unable to get up he crawled into Purdon's yard to avoid attracting attention from persons passing, intending to remain till he should recover from
his intoxication sufficiently to get home. After dark Mrs. Purdon having
occasion to go into the yard, fell over the unconscious form of Kress and
broke her arm in the fall. Pardon was a lessee of the property on whibh
the accident occured. Mrs. Purdon was not a party to the lease. This
is trespass by Purdon and wife each claiming $5,000.
MAUCH for plaintiff.
BUTLER for defendant.
OPINION OF LOWER COURT
ZERBY, J.-There is no question as to the liability of Kress in this
action if the action is properly brought. It has been decided time and
again by the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth that in trespass, the
quo animo is not material to the question of liability and it is no excuse
that the trespasser was an infant or insane or intoxicated, if his intoxication was due to voluntary excessive drinking. This is the state of
facts in this case.
In 78 Pa. 407 Paxon says, "the law is well settled that persons not
suijurisand who have no general capacity to contract debts, are nevertheless liable for their torts.
By inference in Wilt v. Welsh 6 Watts 9 an infant is liable for its
torts.
Therefore how much more liable for their torts are intoxicated persons who voluntarily put themselves into such a condition that is condupive to wrongful acts.
In the case of Sullivan v. Murphy, 2 Miles 298, column 37.484 volume
21 of Pepper and Lewis Digest of Decisions it was held that if the up-setting of scalding water over the plaintiff was due to no improper conduct
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on the part of the defendant, he was not liable, but if the fall was due to
intoxication from voluntary drinking to excess, he was liable.
As to the right of action against Kress by the husband and wife, section 1 Act May 8, 1895 P. L. 54 enacts: Whenever injury not resulting
in death, shall be wrongfully inflicted upon the person of the wife and a
right of action for such wrongful injury accrues to the wife and also to
the husband, these two rights of action shall be redressed in only one
suit brought in the names of husband and wife, and it was held in 201 Pa.
181 that this section is compulsory and only one suit can be brought. And in
14 Sup. Ct. 421 page 422 "it was held that the proper procedure under
this act results in a separate verdict and judgment in favor of each
plaintiff, if both recover." The manifest advantages of the procedure
are, that it saves expense, and, more important, prevents the possibility
of a double recovery of damages resulting from the failure of the jury to
appreciate. the distinctions between the measure of damages in the husband's case and the measure in the wife's case. Held that the wife is entitled
to recover an allowance for the pain and suffering which she fiad undergone and is liable to undergo by reason of the injury, but she is not entitled to any compensation for any pain or suffering which are purely
mental. And this seems to be the law in this State as decided by many
decisions.
Now the question arises, what right of action, if any, has the husband? Does he have any? We think he does. In 24 Super Ct. 27 page
31, it was said that a husband has right to compensation for the aid,
assistance, comfort and society which his wife would be expected to render
him if she had not been injured by the act of the defendant and this without proving the value of the aid assistance, etc. in dollars and cents and
this regardless that the wife is entitled to her separate earnings under
our married woman's acts. In both cases it is a question for the jury
under proper instructions.
Here Purdon was in actual possession and it has been held by a long
line of cases in this state that the action quare clausum fregit is founded
upon possession of the land and not upon the right of property in it and
can be sustained only by the person who has actual possession when the
injury was committed; 25 Pa. 186, 2 Pa. 289, 2 Yeates 210.
The domicile of the wife follows that of the husband, she is on the
premises with his permission and any injury to her caused by negligence
of another is redressable in an action by her.
Therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to such damages as the jury
under proper instructions shall award.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Two questions are presented for consideration: (1) Would Kress be
liable if he had been sober. (2) If so, does the fact that he was drunk
excuse him?
The fact that a man is a trespasser does not render him liable for any
injury to which the fact that he was a trespasser may have contributed
as a remote contributing cause or condition. He is only liable for injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of his acts. The
ordinary rules as to proximate cause, etc., apply as well to the case of a
trespasser as to any other person.- Thompson on Negligence 60; Hol-
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lenbach v. Johnson, 29 N. Y. Supp. 945; 28 A & E. 609; 46 Century Dig.
459. It is true that in Schumaker St. Paull. 46 Minn 39, 12 L. R. A. 257,
it is said, "He who commits a trespass must be held to contemplate all
the damages which may legitimately flow from his illegal act whether he
may have foreseen them or not" and that, "Whoever commits a trespass
or other Wrongful act is liable for all direct injury resulting therefrom,
although such resulting injury could not have been corltemplated as a probable result of the act done." But in the next sentence the court said:
"The damages cannot be considered too remote, if according to the usual
experience of mankind injurious results ought to have been apprehended."
This is the ordinary rule as to proximate cause;-21 A & E. 486.
The question, therefore, arises: Was the injury to Mrs. Purdon the
natural and probable consequence of Kress' act? This woulddepend upon
where Kress was lying. If he was lying in a remote and unfrequented
part of the yard Mrs. Purdon's injury would probably not be regarded as
the natural and probable consequence of his act. If, on the other hand,
he was lying upon the path which led from the house to the street the
fall of Mrs. Purdon and the consequent injury would undoubtedly be the
natural or probable consequence of his act.
The exact spot- at which Kress was lying does not appear. It does
appear, however, that it was dark and that the plaintiff was a woman
and that she had occasion to go into the yard. It is not likely that a
woman would go into an unfrequented or remote portion of the yard
after dark. It is more probable that the place to which she was going
was a place to which she was accustomed to go. Moreover, Purdon was
very drunk and crawled into the yard from the street. Itis highly probable that he did not crawl far from the gate.
At any rate the question of negligence is ordinarily a question for
the jury. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the facts or the inferences
to be drawn from them it is the province of the jury to determine it.Howeth v. P. W. & B. R. R., 166 Pa. 607; P. & L. Dig. Dec.; Vol. 13,
col. 21733 and cases there cited.
In the present case there was such a doubt as to the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom as to justify the court below in submitting the case to the jury.
The fact that Kress was intoxicated does not excuse him. The fact
that a tort was committed while a defendant was intoxicated is no excuse whatever.-Cooley on Torts 63; Jaggard on Torts 165, and cases there
collected.
In Sullivan v. Murphy 2 Miles 293 the facts were as fQllows:
Sullivan was sitting in a bar room near a stove on which was a vessel
containing several gallons of hot water. Murphy and several others entered the room and drank some brandy. Murphy stepped back in order
to allow others to approach the bar and in doing so stumbled and fell
.against the stove and upset the water on Sullivan. In an action brought
by Sullivan the court charged that if Murphy's fall was an accident due
o no fault, negligence or improper conduct on his past he was not liable
but that if his fall was due to intoxication from voluntary drinking to excess he was liable.
Judgment affirmed.

